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UNIQUE ERGODICITY OF
DETERMINISTIC ZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
ANTOINE HOCHART
Abstract. We study the ergodicity of deterministic two-person zero-sum dif-
ferential games. This property is defined by the uniform convergence to a
constant of either the infinite-horizon discounted value as the discount factor
tends to zero, or equivalently, the averaged finite-horizon value as the time
goes to infinity. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the unique
ergodicity of a game. This notion extends the classical one for dynamical sys-
tems, namely when ergodicity holds with any (suitable) perturbation of the
running payoff function. Our main condition is symmetric between the two
players and involve dominions, i.e., subsets of states that one player can make
approximately invariant.
1. Introduction
We study the ergodic problem for deterministic two-player zero-sum differential
games. Such games are defined by a nonlinear system in Rn controlled by two
players,
X˙t = f(Xt, at, bt), X0 = x.
Given a continuous and bounded payoff function ℓ, the players intend to optimize
– minimize for the first player, who chooses the controls at ∈ A, and maximize for
the second player, who chooses the controls bt ∈ B – one of the following payoff
functionals:
Jδ(x, a, b) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δsℓ(Xs, as, bs)ds
for the infinite-horizon discounted game, or
J(t, x, a, b) =
∫ t
0
ℓ(Xs, as, bs)ds
for the game played in finite horizon t. We assume that the data are Zn-periodic in
the state variable x ∈ Rn so that the state space can be identify with the n-torus
Rn/Zn. We also restrict our study to the lower game, in which player 1 adapts her
control to player 2’s action, but all the results can be readily adapted to the upper
game or the situation in which the classical Isaacs condition holds.
The value of the discounted or finite-horizon (lower) game, denoted respectively
by vδ(x) and v(t, x), is the equilibrium payoff and can be characterized as the
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viscosity solution of, respectively, the stationary Hamilton-Jacobi PDE (partial
differential equation)
δu(x) +H(x,Du(x)) = 0
or the evolutionary PDE
∂tu(t, x) +H(x,Du(t, x)) = 0
with boundary condition u(0, x) = 0. In these equations, H refers to the Hamil-
tonian of the (lower) game, defined by
H(x, p) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{
− 〈f(x, a, b), p〉 − ℓ(x, a, b)
}
.
The ergodic problem for zero-sum differential games or for Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tions, its PDE counterpart, concerns the asymptotic behavior of the value functions
vδ(x) and v(t, x). More precisely, it deals with the uniform convergence toward a
constant of δvδ(x) when the discount factor δ goes to zero, and of v(t, x)/t when
the horizon t goes to infinity. The problem has been much studied since the sem-
inal work of Lions, Papanicolaou and Varadhan [LPV87]. To remain concise, let
us just mention few papers with which this work is related: Arisawa [Ari97, Ari98]
for optimal control (i.e., one-player) problems, Alvarez and Bardi [AB03, AB07] or
Cardaliaguet [Car10] for two-player games. The literature on the subject is vast
and we let the interested reader find more references in the latter articles.
Whether we consider the value of a game or the solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi
PDE, it was proved that, under standard assumptions on the data, an Abelian-
Tauberian property holds, that is, if one of the above-mentioned uniform limit
exists and is constant, then the other limit also exists and is equal to the same
ergodic constant, see e.g., [Ari98] for optimal control and [AL98] for stochastic
control, or [AB03] for general second-order Hamilton-Jacobi equations. We further
mention that the ergodicity property of the (lower) game implies that the game
with long time average payoff (also called ergodic payoff)
J∞(x, a, b) = lim inf
t→+∞
1
t
∫ t
0
ℓ(Xs, as, bs)ds
also has a value which is equal to the ergodic constant, see [AB07].
An important problem is then to characterize the differential games which are
ergodic. Typical results assume that the nonlinear system (or a subsystem, if it
is decomposable) is uniformly controllable by one player, that is, any point x is
controllable to any other point y by this player, either exactly or approximately,
asymptotically or in bounded time, see e.g., [Ari98, Bet05, AB07]. Such conditions
are independent of the payoff function ℓ and thus imply that the games are in fact
uniquely ergodic. This notion, which was originally defined for dynamical systems,
readily extends to differential games: a game is uniquely ergodic if it is ergodic for
all perturbations of the payoff function ℓ that only depend on the state variable. In
[Ari97], Arisawa showed that a converse property holds for systems controlled by
one player and proved the existence of an ergodic attractor when unique ergodicity
holds. But for two-player games, these controllability conditions totally lack of
symmetry and focus only on one player.
The purpose of this article is to study this property of unique ergodicity for
differential games. We introduce a “dominion condition” which is in essence sym-
metrical between the two players. A dominion is associated with one player and,
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roughly speaking, corresponds to a nonempty subset of states that this player can
make approximately invariant for the dynamics. We show that if a game is uniquely
ergodic, then the players do not have disjoint dominions. To prove this result, we
use an Hamilton-Jacobi PDE approach. Under specific controllability assumptions
(independence of f with respect to the state variable or uniform time estimates on
the dynamics) we further prove that the “dominion condition” is in fact equivalent
to unique ergodicity. Thus our results generalize the unique ergodicity property
of dynamical systems (we refer to [AB03, Sec. 6.1] for the connections between
classical ergodic theory and ergodicity of games or Hamiltonians), as well as the
analysis of Arisawa in [Ari97, Ari98] for optimal control problems. Let us further
observe that if a system is uniformly controllable by one player, then, whatever
assumptions are made on the controllability (asymptotic or bounded time, exact
or approximate), it implies that the other player has a unique trivial dominion,
namely the whole state space, and so that the “dominion condition” trivially holds.
We finally mention that the notion of dominion is very similar to the one of
leadership and discriminating domain in viability theory, see e.g., [Car96]. However,
the ideas developed in this article are inspired by he study of zero-sum repeated
games (i.e., games played in discrete time), for which they were successfully applied
to the equivalent ergodic problem, see the companion works [Hoc19] and [AGH19].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to preliminaries on
differential games, their value functions and the Hamilton-Jacobi PDE approach
to ergodicity. In Section 3, we study the unique ergodicity property for general
Hamiltonians (i.e., not necessarily associated with a differential game), that is,
the property of an Hamiltonian to be ergodic for any suitable perturbation. This
(slightly) generalizes a characterization by Alvarez and Bardi in [AB10]. In Sec-
tion 4 we introduce the notion of dominion and establish some characterizations.
Finally, in Section 5, we study the unique ergodicity property for differential games,
first following the PDE approach and then by a dynamical system approach.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Framework and standing assumptions. We start by describing the setting
of a deterministic two-player zero-sum differential games that we study in this
article. We first consider the following nonlinear system in Rn controlled by two
players:
(1)
{
X˙t = f(Xt, at, bt), t > 0,
X0 = x,
where the map f : Rn×A×B → Rn, with A,B nonempty compact metric spaces, is
continuous in all variables and Lipschitz continuous in the state variable, uniformly
in the control variables, i.e., denoting by |·| the standard Euclidean norm,
|f(x, a, b)− f(y, a, b)| 6 Lf |x− y|
for some constant Lf > 0 and for all x, y ∈ Rn, a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Player 1 (resp.,
player 2) chooses a control t 7→ at (resp., t 7→ bt) in the set of Lebesgue measurable
functions from [0,+∞) to A (resp., B), which we denote by A (resp., B). – In order
to simplify the notation, we shall equally denote by a and b single elements of A
and B, respectively, and controls of player 1 and player 2, i.e., elements of A and
B, respectively. – The Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem implies that Equation (1) has a
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unique solution, which we denote by Xx,a,bt and for which the differential equation
holds for almost all t > 0.
Carrying on with the definition of a game, we are also given a bounded and
continuous payoff function ℓ : Rn ×A×B → R (we let Mℓ = ‖ℓ‖∞, the supremum
norm of ℓ). Then, for any trajectory of the controlled system (1), we mainly consider
the following payoff functional, which is associated with the game played in infinite
horizon with a discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1) on the running payoff:
Jδ(x, a, b) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δsℓ(Xx,a,bs , as, bs)ds.
The objective of player 1 is to minimize the latter quantity, whereas player 2 intends
to maximize it. We shall also briefly mention the payoff functional associated with
the game played in a finite horizon t > 0:
J(t, x, a, b) =
∫ t
0
ℓ(Xx,a,bs , as, bs)ds.
Throughout the paper we make the following assumption. Let us recall before-
hand that a modulus is a nondecreasing function ω : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞), vanishing
and continuous at 0, that is, such that limr→0 ω(r) = ω(0) = 0.
Assumption A0 (Standing assumption).
(i) The payoff function ℓ is uniformly continuous with respect to the state variable,
uniformly with respect to the control variables, i.e., there exists a modulus ωℓ
such that
|ℓ(x, a, b)− ℓ(y, a, b)| 6 ωℓ(|x− y|), ∀x, y ∈ R
n, ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B.
(ii) The functions f and ℓ are Zn-periodic in the state variable, i.e., for ϕ ∈ {f, ℓ},
ϕ(x+ k, a, b) = ϕ(x, a, b), ∀k ∈ Zn, ∀x ∈ Rn, ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B.
Let us remark that Item (ii) implies that the state space can be identify with the
n-torus Rn/Zn. Although we shall work mostly in Rn, we draw the attention of the
reader to the fact that sometimes we will consider objects in the quotient space.
Moreover, Item (ii) together with the continuity of f entails the boundedness of
this function. We therefore let Mf = ‖f‖∞.
2.2. Value functions and Hamilton-Jacobi equations. We introduce here the
concept of value function and then characterize it in terms of viscosity solution of
some Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We keep the presentation to a minimum and refer
the reader to the classical monograph [BCD97], for instance, for more details.
Let us start with the definition of nonanticipating strategies.
Definition 2.1 (Nonanticipating strategy). A nonanticipating strategy for the first
player is a map α : B → A such that for any time t > 0 and any controls b1, b2 ∈ B
of player 2, if b1s = b
2
s for almost all s 6 t then α[b
1]s = α[b
2]s for almost all s 6 t.
We denote by A the set of nonanticipating strategies for player 1.
The set B of nonanticipating strategies β : A → B for the second player is
defined accordingly.
We then introduce the (unnormalized) value functions. When player 2 chooses a
control b ∈ B and player 1 is allowed to adapt her response to this control, i.e., when
she chooses a nonanticipating strategy α ∈ A , we speak of the lower game, which
UNIQUE ERGODICITY OF ZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 5
we denote by Γ−, and the lower value function associated with the infinite-horizon
discounted payoff functional is defined by
v−δ (x) = inf
α∈A
sup
b∈B
Jδ(x, α[b], b).
On the other hand, if player 1 is bound to choose a control a ∈ A to which player 2
can adapt by choosing a nonanticipating strategy β ∈ B, then we speak of the
upper game, denoted by Γ+, and the upper value function is given by
v+δ (x) = sup
β∈B
inf
a∈A
Jδ(x, a, β[a]).
When the game is played in a finite horizon t > 0, the value functions are defined
similarly by, respectively,
v−(t, x) = inf
α∈A
sup
b∈B
J(t, x, α[b], b) and v+(t, x) = sup
β∈B
inf
a∈A
J(t, x, a, β[a]).
We always have v−δ (x) 6 v
+
δ (x) (resp., v
−(t, x) 6 v+(t, x)) and the differential
game is said to have a value at state x if there is equality. The latter holds under the
classical Isaacs condition (which we recall at the end of the section). However, in
this work, we do not need to make such an assumption: all the results presented in
the article hold in the lower as well as in the upper game. Owing to the symmetry
of Γ− and Γ+, we shall only consider from now on the lower game, and therefore
drop the “-” superscript for simplicity of the notation. We leave to the reader the
straightforward adaptation of the results to the upper game (or to the situation in
which Isaacs’ condition holds).
We readily deduce from the above definitions that the normalized value func-
tions x 7→ δvδ(x) and (t, x) 7→ v(t, x)/t are bounded by Mℓ and Zn-periodic. It
is also known that they are respectively (uniformly) continuous on Rn and Lip-
schitz continuous on [0, T ] × Rn for all times T > 0. Furthermore, they can be
characterized as viscosity solutions of some partial differential equations (PDEs
for short), called Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs’ equations. The latter involve the (lower)
Hamiltonian, defined by
(2) H(x, p) = H−(x, p) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{
− 〈f(x, a, b), p〉 − ℓ(x, a, b)
}
, x, p ∈ Rn,
where 〈·, ·〉 is the standard scalar product on Rn. We mention that in this paper,
the solutions of PDEs will always be in the continuous viscosity sense. Moreover,
given any real function (t, x) 7→ ϕ(t, x), we will denote by ∂tϕ its partial derivative
with respect to the time variable t, and by Dϕ its gradient with respect to the state
variable x.
Theorem 2.2. Under all the above assumptions on f and ℓ, the value function vδ
is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
(HJδ)
{
δu(x) +H(x,Du(x)) = 0, in Rn,
u Zn-periodic,
and the value function (t, x) 7→ v(t, x) is the unique continuous viscosity solution
of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
(HJt)

∂tu(t, x) +H(x,Du(t, x)) = 0, in (0,+∞)× Rn,
u(0, x) = 0, for all x ∈ Rn,
u(t, ·) Zn-periodic, for all t > 0.
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The upper value functions are characterized by the same PDEs after replacing
the lower Hamiltonian H with the upper Hamiltonian
H+(x, p) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
{
− 〈f(x, a, b), p〉 − ℓ(x, a, b)
}
, x, p ∈ Rn.
Consequently, if Isaacs’ condition holds, that is, if
(3) max
a∈A
min
b∈B
{
− 〈f(x, a, b), p〉 − ℓ(x, a, b)
}
= min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{
− 〈f(x, a, b), p〉 − ℓ(x, a, b)
}
, ∀x, p ∈ Rn,
then the lower and the upper value functions are equal.
2.3. Ergodicity and PDE approach. In this article, we are interested in the
asymptotic behavior of the value functions, that is, in the behavior of vδ(x) as the
discount rate δ goes to 0 (resp., of v(t, x) as the time horizon t goes to +∞). More
specifically, we study the so-called ergodic problem, that is, the situation in which
there exists a constant λ ∈ R such that the normalized value δvδ(x) tends to λ as δ
goes to 0 (resp., v(t, x)/t tends to λ as t goes to +∞) uniformly in x. This property
is called ergodicity of the game.
Thanks to the characterization theorem 2.2, the latter problem can be studied by
a PDE approach. With this in mind, we shall sometimes consider arbitrary Hamil-
tonians (x, p) 7→ H(x, p) defined on Rn × Rn that satisfy the following properties.
Note that these properties are inherited from the Hamiltonian defined in (2).
Assumption A1.
(i) The Hamiltonian H : Rn × Rn → R is continuous.
(ii) H is Zn-periodic in the first variable, i.e, for all x, p ∈ Rn and k ∈ Zn,
H(x+ k, p) = H(x, p).
(iii) There is a modulus ω : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) such that, for all x, y, p ∈ Rn,
|H(x, p)−H(y, p)| 6 ω
(
|x− y| (1 + |p|)
)
.
(iv) There is a function H∞ : R
n×Rn → R that is positively homogeneous of degree
one in the second variable, and a constant MH > 0 such that, for all x, p ∈ Rn,
|H(x, p)−H∞(x, p)| 6MH .
Let us make few comments about these assumptions. First, Items (i) to (iii)
imply that the PDEs (HJδ) and (HJt) have a unique continuous viscosity solution.
In particular, Item (iii) implies that the comparison principle for viscosity solutions
holds. Second, the map H∞ introduced in Item (iv) is called the recession function
of H . The positive homogeneity of degree one means that
H∞(x, νp) = νH∞(x, p)
for all x, p ∈ Rn and all ν > 0. A consequence is that
lim
ν→+∞
H(x, νp)
ν
= H∞(x, p)
uniformly in (x, p), and so H∞ is necessarily unique, continuous and Z
n-periodic
in the first variable. Let us observe that if H is the Hamiltonian associated with
the lower game Γ−, as defined in (2), then
(4) H∞(x, p) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{
− 〈f(x, a, b), p〉
}
, x, p ∈ Rn.
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Following a PDE approach, the existence and the value of the ergodic constant
λ defined above can be related with the viscosity solutions of the following cell
problem:
(CP)
{
c+H(x,Dw(x)) = 0, in Rn,
w Zn-periodic.
The next result explains this connection. In its statement, we abbreviate upper
semicontinuous as u.s.c. and lower semicontinuous as l.s.c. Note that the result
which appears in [AB03] was shown for second-order Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs.
Theorem 2.3 ([AB03, Thm. 4]). Let H be an arbitrary Hamiltonian satisfying
Items (i) to (iii) of Assumption A1. The following assertions are equivalent.
(i) If uδ is the solution of the stationary problem (HJδ), then δuδ(x) converges
uniformly in x to a constant λ1 ∈ R as δ goes to 0.
(ii) If u is the solution of the Cauchy problem (HJt), then u(t, x)/t converges uni-
formly in x to a constant λ2 ∈ R as t goes to +∞.
(iii) There exists a constant λ3 such that
sup {c ∈ R | there is an u.s.c. subsolution of (CP)}
= λ3 = inf {c ∈ R | there is a l.s.c. supersolution of (CP)} .
Moreover, if one of the above assertion is true, then λ1 = λ2 = λ3.
When an arbitrary Hamiltonian H satisfies one (hence all) of the above asser-
tions, we say that it is ergodic. We refer the reader to [AB03, Sec. 6] for a detailed
discussion on the connections between classical ergodic theory of deterministic dy-
namical systems and ergodicity of Hamiltonians.
3. Unique ergodicity of Hamiltonians
In this section, we introduce the central concept of this article, namely unique
ergodicity, which we first apply to arbitrary Hamiltonians.
Unique ergodicity is a property that originally applies to dynamical systems.
Although its definition (existence of a unique invariant probability measure) cannot
be readily extended to differential games or a fortiori to arbitrary Hamiltonians,
it is its characterization in terms of constant long time averages of any continuous
function along the trajectories that makes this extension possible.
Alvarez and Bardi in [AB10] used this terminology of unique ergodicity and
studied the property for two-player controlled systems. However, we mention that
before this work, the property was already studied for controlled systems, although
without being given any explicit name, see for instance [Ari97, Ari98].
3.1. Definition and characterization.
Definition 3.1 (Uniquely ergodic Hamiltonian). Let H : Rn × Rn → R be an
Hamiltonian satisfying Items (i) to (iii) in Assumption A1. We say that H is
uniquely ergodic if, for every continuous and Zn-periodic function g : Rn → R, the
perturbed Hamiltonian g + H is ergodic, i.e., one (hence all) of the assertions in
Theorem 2.3 holds with g +H.
In the remainder, we denote by C0per(R
n) the space of continuous and Zn-periodic
real functions over Rn.
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We next give a characterization of unique ergodicity which is very similar to
Proposition 2.3 in [AB10] – as a matter of fact, most of the proof is borrowed from
the latter reference, which we have chosen to reproduce for the sake of completeness.
However, our result differs from the one of Alvarez and Bardi in two ways. First, it
is not restricted to Hamiltonians associated with differential games but it applies to
arbitrary Hamiltonians. Second, our definition of unique ergodicity is slightly more
general, in the sense that we only need to consider perturbations of Hamiltonians
of the form g ∈ C0per(R
n).
Theorem 3.2 (compare with [AB10, Prop. 2.3]). Let H : Rn × Rn → R be an
Hamiltonian satisfying Assumption A1. It is uniquely ergodic if and only if the
following assertions hold:
• (Structural equicontinuity) for every continuous and Zn-periodic function g :
Rn → R, if uδ denotes the solution of (HJδ) with the Hamiltonian g +H, then
the family {δuδ}0<δ61 is equicontinuous;
• (Strong maximum principle) the constant functions are the only continuous vis-
cosity solutions of the PDE
(HJ∞)
{
H∞(x,Dw(x)) = 0, in R
n,
w Zn-periodic,
where H∞ is the recession function of H.
Proof. Let us first assume that H is uniquely ergodic. Let g ∈ C0per(R
n) and, for
δ ∈ (0, 1], let uδ be the solution of (HJδ) with the Hamiltonian g+H . Since g+H
satisfies Assumption A1, the standard comparison principle for viscosity solutions
holds and a straightforward application of it yields first that the family {δuδ}0<δ61
is uniformly bounded by Mg = ‖g(·) +H(·, 0)‖∞ and then, using this fact, that
‖uδ − uδ′‖∞ 6Mg
∣∣∣∣1δ − 1δ′
∣∣∣∣
for all δ, δ′ ∈ (0, 1]. The solution of (HJδ) being continuous, we deduce that the
function (δ, x) 7→ δuδ(x) is continuous on (0, 1]×Rn. Together with the hypothesis
that δuδ(x) converges uniformly in x to a constant when δ goes to 0, it entails the
equicontinuity of {δuδ}0<δ61.
To show that the second point (strong maximum principle) holds, let us consider
any continuous viscosity solution w of (HJ∞). Fix ρ > 0 and denote by u
ρ
δ the
solution of (HJδ) with the Hamiltonian −ρw +H , i.e., the solution of
(5)
{
δu(x)− ρw(x) +H(x,Du(x)) = 0, in Rn,
u Zn-periodic.
Let us show that wρδ =
1
δ (ρw−MH), whereMH is the constant defined in Item (iv)
of Assumption A1 for the Hamiltonian H , is a viscosity subsolution of (5). To that
purpose, for any x ∈ Rn, let us consider any continuously differentiable function ϕ
such that wρδ − ϕ has a local maximum point at x. Then the function w −
δ
ρϕ has
also a local maximum at x, which implies that H∞(x,
δ
ρDϕ(x)) 6 0. The positive
homogeneity of H∞ yields H∞(x,Dϕ(x)) 6 0. We then have
δwρδ (x) − ρw(x) +H(x,Dϕ(x)) = −MH +H(x,Dϕ(x)) 6 H∞(x,Dϕ(x)) 6 0.
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This proves that wρδ is a viscosity subsolution of (5) at any x. Since w hence w
ρ
δ is
continuous, the comparison principle applies, leading to wρδ =
1
δ (ρw −MH) 6 u
ρ
δ .
Similarly, we can show that 1δ (ρw +MH) is a viscosity supersolution of (5), hence
that uρδ 6
1
δ (ρw +MH).
Since H is uniquely ergodic, we know that δuρδ converges to some constant λρ
when δ goes to 0. Thus, passing to the limit in the latter inequalities, we get
ρw(x) −MH 6 λρ 6 ρw(y) +MH
for all x, y ∈ Rn and all ρ > 0, which yields
w(x) − w(y) 6
2MH
ρ
.
Letting ρ goes to +∞, we obtain that w(x)−w(y) 6 0 for all x, y ∈ Rn, hence that
w is constant. This concludes the necessary part of the proof.
We now prove the sufficient part and assume that the structural equicontinuity
property and the strong maximum principle hold true. Let g be any function in
C0per(R
n) and denote by uδ the solution of Equation (HJδ) with g + H . We have
already mentionned at the beginning of the proof that the family {δuδ}0<δ61 is
uniformly bounded. Since it is also equicontinuous by hypothesis, the Arzela`-Ascoli
theorem entails the existence of a subsequence that converges uniformly to some
continuous and Zn-periodic function w.
Multiplying (HJδ) by δ, we get that the function δuδ solves in R
n the equation
δu(x) + δg(x) + δH
(
x, δ−1Du(x)
)
= 0
with u being Zn-periodic. Since (x, r, p) 7→ δr + δg(x) + δH(x, δ−1p) converges as
δ goes to 0 to (x, r, p) 7→ H∞(x, p) locally uniformly in Rn × R× Rn, the stability
property of viscosity solutions yields that the uniform limit w is solution of (HJ∞),
hence constant since the strong maximum principle applies. We then deduce that
Item (iii) of Theorem 2.3 is satisfied. Indeed the implication (i) ⇒ (iii) remains
true if, instead of the whole family {δuδ}, there is only a subsequence of {δuδ} that
converges uniformly to a constant (for the details, see the proof of [AB03, Thm. 4]).
Thus the Hamiltonian g+H is ergodic which proves that H is uniquely ergodic. 
By adapting the proof with the following weaker hypothesis, we can also get a
sufficient condition of ergodicity.
Proposition 3.3. Let H be an arbitrary Hamiltonian satisfying Assumption A1.
If the family {δuδ}0<δ61, where uδ is the solution of (HJδ), is equicontinuous and
if the strong maximum principle holds, then H is ergodic. 
Example 3.4. Consider a differential game with state space in R2 whose dynamics
is defined for all x ∈ R2 by
f(x, a, b) =
(
a
γb
)
, a, b ∈ [−1, 1],
with 0 < γ 6 1. Then, as we shall see in the next section (see Example 3.6),
for any payoff function ℓ satisfying Assumption A0, the family of value functions
{δvδ}0<δ61 is equicontinuous. On the other hand, the recession operator of the
Hamiltonian of the game is
H∞(x, p) = |p1| − γ |p2| , x, p =
(
p1
p2
)
∈ R2,
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and we know that (HJ∞) has a nonconstant solution if and only if γ ∈ Q (see e.g.,
[Car10]). Thus, the game is ergodic if γ is irrational.
3.2. Equicontinuity of {δuδ}. Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3 tell us that
(unique) ergodicity relies on two distinct properties. As we shall see in Section 5,
the strong maximum principle is a qualitative feature of the underlying dynamical
system, which can be systematically characterized. On the other hand, the (struc-
tural) equicontinuity property appears more difficult to apprehend and is rather
related with quantitative aspects of the underlying dynamics (e.g., controllability
assumptions with specific time estimates). We next review two sufficient conditions
on any Hamiltonian H that guarantee the equicontinuity of the family {δuδ}. Let
us mention that for both conditions, the equicontinuity property is stable by per-
turbations of H with functions g ∈ C0per(R
n), that is, equicontinuity is “structural”
(in the sense of Theorem 3.2).
The first of these conditions is a classic: it is well known that equicontinuity of
{δuδ} holds if H is coercive in the second variable, i.e.,
lim
|p|→+∞
H(x, p) = +∞
uniformly in x. More precisely, this property implies that the family {uδ} is uni-
formly Lipschitz continuous. This yields in particular the existence of a corrector,
that is, a solution to (CP), see [LPV87].
Secondly, the equicontinuity property holds if H is uniformly continuous in x,
uniformly with respect to p, i.e., there exists a modulus ω such that
(6) |H(x, p)−H(y, p)| 6 ω(|x− y|)
for all x, y ∈ Rn and all p ∈ Rn.
Indeed, the equicontinuity of {δuδ} can be readily shown via the comparison
principle, after noticing that uδ(· + h) − δ−1ω(|h|) and uδ(· + h) + δ−1ω(|h|) are
respectively subsolution and supersolution of (HJδ) (see [Car10]).
Example 3.5. Assume thatH(x, p) = H˜(p)−ℓ˜(x), where the function H˜ : Rn → R
is continuous and ℓ˜ : Rn → R is continuous and Zn-periodic. Then H satisfies (6),
hence the structural equicontinuity property holds.
Example 3.6. Assume that H is the Hamiltonian of a deterministic zero-sum
differential game Γ− for which the function f that controls the dynamics only
depends on the control variables but not on the state, that is, f(x, a, b) = f˜(a, b)
for some continuous function f˜ : A×B → Rn and for all x. Then H writes
H(x, p) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
{
− 〈f˜(a, b), p〉 − ℓ(x, a, b)
}
and one can easily see that it satisfies condition (6) with modulus ωℓ. Thus the
structural equicontinuity property holds. Observe that if ℓ(x, a, b) = ℓ˜(x) for all
x, a, b and some ℓ˜ ∈ C0per(R
n), then we recover as a special case the previous example.
4. Dominions
We introduce in this section the main tool of this article, namely dominions,
which we shall use to characterize unique ergodicity of differential games. Informally
speaking, dominions are subsets of state that can be made approximately invariant
by one player for an arbitrary period of time. This is an adaptation to the framework
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of differential games of a notion that was used to study zero-sum repeated games
(played in discrete time), see in particular the companion works [AGH19, Hoc19].
However, as we shall prove, the notion coincides with the one of leadership domain
and discriminating domain which appears in viability theory (see, e.g., [Car96]).
4.1. Definition and operator-theoretic characterization. Before giving the
formal definition of a dominion, let us recall that we are considering a determin-
istic zero-sum differential game in its lower from Γ− and that we denote by H its
Hamiltonian (2). With the aim of simplifying the notation, we shall hereafter write
Xx,α,bt , instead of X
x,α[b],b
t , the solution of the controlled system (1) induced by a
strategy α ∈ A of player 1 and a control b ∈ B of player 2. Also, we let distK(x)
be the distance of a point x ∈ Rn to a subset K ⊂ Rn, that is,
distK(x) := inf
y∈K
|y − x| .
Definition 4.1 (Dominions). A dominion of the first player in the lower game Γ−
is a nonempty closed set D ⊂ Rn such that for every initial position in D, player 1
can force the state to remain approximately in D for any arbitrary period of time,
meaning that
∀x ∈ D, ∀ε > 0, ∀T > 0, ∃α ∈ A ,
∀b ∈ B, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], distD(X
x,α,b
t ) 6 ε.
Dominions for the second player are defined accordingly. Specifically, a dominion
of player 2 in Γ− is a nonempty closed set D ⊂ Rn such that
∀x ∈ D, ∀ε > 0, ∀T > 0, ∀α ∈ A , ∃b ∈ B,
∀t ∈ [0, T ], distD(X
x,α,b
t ) 6 ε.
In the next results, we characterize dominions of player 1 and player 2 in operator-
theoretic terms. These characterizations stem from the similarities that exist be-
tween dominions on the one hand, and the interpretation of discriminating and
leadership domains which appear in viability theory, on the other hand. Indeed,
the latter, which are defined by means of inequalities involving H∞, can also be
characterized in terms of invariant dynamics (see, e.g., [Car96]). This correspon-
dence between the two notions can be readily established for leadership domains
and dominions of player 2 in the lower game (see Theorem 2.3, ibid.). As for the
correspondence between discriminating domains and dominions of player 1, it is not
as straightforward since the interpretation theorem (Theorem 2.1, ibid.) requires
convexity properties. Such assumptions (typically, A is convex and f is affine in a)
are commonly assumed in viability theory but are not needed here. Nevertheless,
by adapting the proof of the latter result to our setting, we are able to show that
dominions of the first player in Γ− can indeed be characterized as discriminating
domains. We next state precisely these results.
To that purpose, we need to introduce the following definition. A vector p ∈ Rn
is a proximal normal to a subset K of Rn at point x ∈ K if distK(x+ p) = |p|. We
denote by NPK(x) the set of proximal normals to K at x. Note that, if we let PKz
be the set of projections of any point z ∈ Rn onto K, i.e.,
PKz :=
{
x ∈ K | distK(z) = |x− z|
}
,
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then the definition of a proximal normal implies that for every p ∈ NPK(x) and
every ν ∈ (0, 1), we have PK(x+νp) = {x}. Let us also recall the following standard
estimates on the trajectories of (1) (where ‖f‖∞ = Mf):∣∣∣Xx,a,bt − x∣∣∣ 6Mf t,(7) ∣∣∣Xx,a,bt −Xy,a,bt ∣∣∣ 6 eLf t |x− y| ,(8)
for all x, y ∈ Rn, a ∈ A, b ∈ B and t > 0.
The following operator-theoretic characterization of dominions of player 2 in Γ−
comes from the correspondence of the latter with leadership domains in viability
theory.
Theorem 4.2 ([Car96, Thm. 2.3]). A nonempty closed set D is a dominion of
player 2 in the lower game Γ− if and only if
∀x ∈ D, ∀p ∈ NPD(x), H∞(x,−p) 6 0,
i.e., min
b∈B
max
a∈A
〈f(x, a, b), p〉 6 0.
We next give a similar characterization for dominions of player 1, this time
coming from their interpretation as discriminating domains.
Theorem 4.3. A nonempty closed set D is a dominion of player 1 in the lower
game Γ− if and only if
∀x ∈ D, ∀p ∈ NPD(x), H∞(x, p) > 0,
i.e., max
b∈B
min
a∈A
〈f(x, a, b), p〉 6 0.
Proof. We first prove the necessary part and suppose that D is a dominion of
player 1. Toward a contradiction, let us assume that there exists a positive constant
η, some x ∈ D and some p ∈ NPD(x) such that
max
b∈B
min
a∈A
〈f(x, a, b), p〉 > η > 0.
Since the function b 7→ mina∈A〈f(x, a, b), p〉 is upper semicontinuous and B is
compact, there exists an action b¯ ∈ B such that
(9) ∀a ∈ A, 〈f(x, a, b¯), p〉 > η.
Let b ∈ B be the constant control equal to b¯, i.e., bt = b¯ for all t > 0.
Since D is a dominion of player 1, given ε > 0 and T > 0 there exists a strategy
α ∈ A such that distD(X
x,α,b
t ) 6 ε for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In order to simplify the
notation, let Xt = X
x,α,b
t . Then, for all t ∈ [0, T ], choosing any point yt in PDXt,
the set of projections of Xt on D, we have
(10) |x+ p−Xt| > |x+ p− yt| − |Xt − yt| > |p| − ε,
where we use the fact that yt ∈ D and that |x+ p− yt| > distD(x + p) = |p| since
p ∈ NPD(x).
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On the other hand, for almost all t ∈ [0, T ] we have
1
2
d
dt
|Xt − (x + p)|
2 = 〈X˙t, Xt − (x+ p)〉
= 〈f(Xt, α[b]t, bt), Xt − x〉 − 〈f(Xt, α[b]t, bt), p〉
6 |Xt − x| |f(Xt, α[b]t, bt)|
+ |p| |f(Xt, α[b]t, bt)− f(x, α[b]t, bt)| − 〈f(x, α[b]t, bt), p〉
6Mf(Mf + Lf |p|)t− η.
To establish the last inequality, we used the estimate (7); the Lipschitz continuity
of f (with Lipschitz constant Lf ); and (9). Let C = Mf(Mf + Lf |p|). After
integrating the latter inequality we get, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
|Xt − (x + p)|
2 − |p|2 6 Ct2 − 2ηt,
which, combined with (10), yields
(11) ε2 − 2 |p| ε 6 Ct2 − 2ηt.
Note that to square (10), we need to assume that ε 6 |p|, which is possible because
p is different from 0 (otherwise (9) would not hold). In the latter inequality, the
positive constants |p|, C and η are fixed, whereas ε and T are arbitrary. Hence, by
choosing T = η/C and rewriting (11) with t = T we obtain
ε2 − 2 |p| ε 6 −
η2
C
which is a contradiction if ε is small enough. This concludes the proof of the
necessary part.
We now prove the sufficient part and assume that for all points x in D and all
proximal normals p in NPD(x), we have
(12) max
b∈B
min
a∈A
〈f(x, a, b), p〉 6 0.
We then fix x ∈ D and positive constants ε and T . Our aim is to construct
recursively on the subintervals [tk, tk+1) of a well-chosen partition {tk = k
T
N }06k6N
of [0, T ], a nonanticipating strategy α of player 1 such that distD(X
x,α,b
t ) 6 ε for
all t ∈ [0, T ] and all controls b of player 2. The mesh θ = TN of the partition
(which shall depend only on x, ε, T and the data of the problem) will be chosen a
posteriori, so we assume for now that it is fixed. Also, for any z ∈ Rn we shall fix
a point in PDz which we denote by pD(z).
We start by selecting an arbitrary element a¯ in A and set α[b]t = a¯ for all
b ∈ B and t ∈ [0, t1). Note that α is obviously nonanticipating on [0, t1), that
is, for any controls b1, b2 ∈ B that coincide almost everywhere on [0, t1), we have
α[b1]t = α[b
2]t for (almost) all t ∈ [0, t1).
Next we assume that α has been defined on [0, tk) with 0 < k < N and that it
is nonanticipating on this interval. Given any control b ∈ B, if Xx,α,btk ∈ D, then
we set α[b]t = a¯ on [tk, tk+1). Otherwise, letting Xk = X
x,α,b
tk (for simplicity) and
yk = pD(Xk), we introduce the set-valued map Φ defined from B to A by
∀b′ ∈ B, Φ(b′) =
{
a ∈ A | 〈f(yk, a, b
′), Xk − yk〉 6 0
}
.
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Let us observe that Φ depends on the control b only through Xk. Thus, if two
controls b1 and b2 are equal almost everywhere on [0, tk), then X
x,α,b1
tk = X
x,α,b2
tk
and therefore they define the same set-valued map.
Since f is continuous, Φ is measurable and has closed values. Moreover, since
Xk−yk ∈ NPD(yk) by definition, (12) implies that the domain of Φ is B, i.e., Φ(b
′)
is nonempty for all b′ ∈ B. Hence, according to the Measurable Selection Theorem
(see [AF09, Thm. 8.1.3]), Φ admits a measurable selection φ : B → A. Then we
set α[b]t = φ(bt) for all t ∈ [tk, tk+1). It is readily seen that α is nonanticipating on
[0, tk+1), whence on [0, T ) after repeating the induction step until tk+1 = T . For
t = T , we set α[b]T = a¯ for all b ∈ B.
To conclude the proof, it remains to show that distD(X
x,α,b
t ) 6 ε on [0, T ] for
every control b of player 2. So we fix b ∈ B and let Xt = X
x,α,b
t . We also let
Xk = Xtk and yk = pD(Xk). For all k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and for almost all
t ∈ [tk, tk+1] we have
1
2
d
dt
|Xt − yk|
2 = 〈f(Xt, α[b]t, bt), Xt − yk〉
= 〈f(Xt, α[b]t, bt)− f(yk, α[b]t, bt), Xt − yk〉
+ 〈f(yk, α[b]t, bt), Xt −Xk〉+ 〈f(yk, α[b]t, bt), Xk − yk〉
6 Lf |Xt − yk|
2
+Mf |Xt −Xk|+ 〈f(yk, α[b]t, bt), Xk − yk〉
6 Lf |Xt − yk|
2
+M2f (t− tk).
To establish the latter inequality, we used the estimate (7) and the fact that either
Xk /∈ D, in which case 〈f(yk, α[b]t, bt), Xk − yk〉 6 0 by definition of α, or Xk ∈ D
which implies Xk − yk = 0. By integration we then obtain
|Xt − yk|
2
6 |Xk − yk|
2 +M2f (t− tk)
2 + 2Lf
∫ t
tk
|Xs − yk|
2 ds
for all k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and t ∈ [tk, tk+1]. Gro¨nwall’s inequality yields
|Xt − yk|
2
6
(
|Xk − yk|
2
+M2f (t− tk)
2
)
e2Lf (t−tk)
and thus
distD(Xt)
2
6
(
distD(Xk)
2 +M2f θ
2
)
e2Lfθ.
If we apply the latter inequality to t = tk+1, we can use it to show by induction
that, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
distD(Xk)
2 6M2f θ
2e2Lfθ
(
1 + · · ·+ e2Lf (k−1)θ
)
.
Combining now the last two inequalities, we deduce that for all k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}
and all t ∈ [tk, tk+1],
distD(Xt)
2 6M2f θ
2e2Lfθ
(
1 + · · ·+ e2Lfkθ
)
= M2f θ
2e2Lfθ
e2Lf (k+1)θ − 1
e2Lfθ − 1
.
Since kθ 6 Nθ = T and (ex − 1)−1 6 x−1 if x > 0, we finally get, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
distD(Xt)
2 6
M2f
2Lf
θe2Lfθ
(
e2LfT − 1
)
.
The proof is complete once we have observed that we can choose the mesh of the
partition, θ = TN , depending only on Mf , Lf , T and ε, so that the right-hand side
in the latter inequality is lower than ε2. 
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Remark 4.4. The definition and the characterization of dominions in the upper
game Γ+ are identical after switching the identity of the players (the fact that one
is minimizing and the other maximizing does not come into account). In particular,
Theorem 4.3 and the classical min-max inequality yield that a dominion of player 1
in Γ+ is also a dominion in Γ−. Similarly, using Theorem 4.2, a dominion of player 2
in Γ− is also a dominion in Γ+. These observations are consistent with the fact that
each player has more information in one game than in the other (Γ− for player 1,
Γ+ for player 2), hence has an advantage in this game. Furthermore, note that
when Isaacs’ condition (3) applies to H∞, then each player has the same dominions
in the lower and the upper game.
Example 4.5. Consider the game already introduced in Example 3.4, whose con-
trolled system is defined in R2 by the function
f(x, a, b) =
(
a
γb
)
, a, b ∈ [−1, 1],
with 0 < γ 6 1 (and with any payoff function ℓ satisfying Assumption A0). Let us
observe that Isaacs’ condition holds for H∞:
H∞(x, p) = min
b∈[−1,1]
max
a∈[−1,1]
{−ap1 − γbp2}
= max
a∈[−1,1]
min
b∈[−1,1]
{−ap1 − γbp2} = |p1| − γ |p2| .
Hence, according to the above remark, the dominions are the same in the lower and
the upper game. Therefore, in order to describe them, whatever the game (lower
or upper) we are considering, we can use their simplest definition for each player,
namely for player 1: dominions as defined in Γ−; for player 2: dominions as defined
in Γ+. Following this observation, we can easily see that any line of the form
V 1µ = x+
(
µ
1
)
R :=
{(
x1 + sµ
x2 + s
)}
s∈R
with x ∈ R2 and −1 6 µγ 6 1 is a dominion of player 1. Indeed, in the lower game,
if she uses the strategy α[b] = µγb against all b ∈ B, then V 1µ will be invariant for
any initial point in it. Dually, any line of the form
V 2ν = x+
(
1
ν
)
R :=
{(
x1 + s
x2 + sν
)}
s∈R
with −γ 6 ν 6 γ is a dominion of player 2. Indeed, in the upper game, he can
choose the strategy β[a] = νγ a against all a ∈ A to ensure the invariance of V
2
ν .
4.2. Further characterization. We give here an alternative characterization of
dominions which we will use late later. Given a subset K ⊂ Rn, we denote by Kε
the set of points whose distance to K is not greater than ε > 0, i.e.,
Kε := {x ∈ R
n | distK(x) 6 ε}.
Also, we denote by 1K the indicator function of K, defined by 1K(x) = 1 if x ∈ K
and 1K(x) = 0 if x /∈ K.
Lemma 4.6. A nonempty closed set D ⊂ Rn is a dominion of player 1 in the
lower game Γ− if and only if for some (hence all) δ > 0,
∀x ∈ D, ∀ε > 0, sup
α∈A
inf
b∈B
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1Dε
(
Xx,α,bs
)
ds = 1.
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Proof. We first assume thatD is a dominion of player 1 and fix some discount factor
δ > 0. Let x ∈ D and ε > 0. For any horizon T > 0, there is a strategy α¯ ∈ A
of player 1 such that, for all controls b ∈ B of player 2 and all times t ∈ [0, T ],
Xx,α¯,bt ∈ Dε. So, for all b ∈ B we have
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1Dε
(
Xx,α¯,bs
)
ds > δ
∫ T
0
e−δsds = 1− e−δT .
Hence we get
sup
α∈A
inf
b∈B
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1Dε
(
Xx,α,bs
)
ds > 1− e−δT
for all T > 0. Taking the limit as T goes to ∞, and since the integral is bounded
above by 1, we finally get that
sup
α∈A
inf
b∈B
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1Dε
(
Xx,α,bs
)
ds = 1.
We now assume that D is not a dominion of player 1. Since it is nonempty, it
means that there exist some x¯ ∈ D, ε > 0 and T > 0 such that for all strategies α of
player 1, player 2 can choose a control b for which X x¯,α,bt /∈ D2ε at some t ∈ [0, T ].
Using the estimate (7) we deduce that
∀s ∈
[
t−
ε
Mf
, t+
ε
Mf
]
,
∣∣∣X x¯,α,bs −X x¯,α,bt ∣∣∣ 6 ε,
hence X x¯,α,bs /∈ Dε. Note that, since X
x¯,α,b
t /∈ D2ε, the estimate (7) necessarily
implies t− εMf > 0.
For any δ > 0 we then have
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1Dε
(
X x¯,α,bs
)
ds 6 δ
∫ t− ε
Mf
0
e−δsds+ δ
∫ ∞
t+ ε
Mf
e−δsds
= 1− 2e−δt sinh
(
δε
Mf
)
6 1− 2e−δT sinh
(
δε
Mf
)
.
Thus
sup
α∈A
inf
b∈B
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1Dε
(
X x¯,α,bs
)
ds 6 1− 2e−δT sinh
(
δε
Mf
)
< 1,
which concludes the proof. 
With a minor adaptation of the proof, which we leave to the reader, we can show
a dual characterization of dominions for the second player.
Lemma 4.7. A nonempty closed set D ⊂ Rn is a dominion of player 2 in the
lower game Γ− if and only if for some (hence all) δ > 0,
∀x ∈ D, ∀ε > 0, inf
α∈A
sup
b∈B
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1Dε
(
Xx,α,bs
)
ds = 1. 
Remark 4.8. We can also give a similar characterization of dominions with the
time averages
1
T
∫ T
0
1Dε
(
Xx,α,bs
)
ds.
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4.3. Reachable sets. We identify here specific classes of dominions, which shall
appear later in the article. Let us first start by introducing these sets. Given any
strategy α ∈ A of player 1, we define the reachable set from a point x ∈ Rn for
player 2 by
R1α(x) :=
{
Xx,α,bt | b ∈ B, t > 0
}
.
On the other hand, for all strategies α ∈ A of player 1, let us associate a control
bα ∈ B of player 2. Then, we define the reachable set from x ∈ Rn for player 1 by
R2b(·)(x) :=
{
Xx,α,bαt | α ∈ A , t > 0
}
.
Furthermore, we say that the map α 7→ bα is nonanticipating if α1[b]s = α2[b]s
for all b ∈ B and almost all s ∈ [0, t] implies that (bα1)s = (bα2)s for almost all
s ∈ [0, t]. That is, if α1 and α2 coincide almost surely on [0, t], then the same is
true for bα1 and bα2 .
We then have the following result.
Lemma 4.9. Given a strategy α ∈ A of player 1, the topological closure of the
reachable set from any point x ∈ Rn for player 2, R1α(x), is a dominion of player 1.
Dually, given a map α 7→ bα from A to B which is nonanticipating, the closure
of the reachable set from x for player 1, R2b(·)(x), is a dominion of player 2.
Proof. We show in detail that R1α(x) is a dominion of player 1, and leave to the
reader the details of the proof forR2b(·)(x), which follows the same lines. Nevertheless
we will highlight the important changes.
First, for any point y ∈ R1α(x), we show that we can construct a strategy α¯ ∈ A
of player 1 such that Xy,α¯,bs ∈ R
1
α(x) for all controls b ∈ B of player 2 and all times
s > 0. Indeed, there exist b¯ ∈ B and t > 0 such that y = Xx,α,b¯t . Then, for any
control b ∈ B, let us introduce the control b¯|b obtained by concatenating b¯ and b in
the following way:
(b¯|b)s =
{
b¯s, if s 6 t,
bs−t, if s > t.
We further define the strategy α¯ of player 1 as follows: α¯[b]s = α[b¯|b]s+t for all
s > 0. It is straightforward to verify that α¯ is nonanticipating and, moreover, that
for all s > 0, Xy,α¯,bs = X
x,α,b¯|b
s+t . Thus, for all s > 0 we have X
y,α¯,b
s ∈ R
1
α(x).
Consider now z ∈ R1α(x) \ R
1
α(x) and fix some ε > 0 and T > 0. There exists
y ∈ R1α(x) such that |y − z| 6 εe
−LfT . Let α¯ ∈ A be the strategy of player 1
defined above, which ensures that Xy,α¯,bs ∈ R
1
α(x) for all b ∈ B and s > 0. From
the estimate (8) we deduce that, for all s > 0,∣∣Xy,α¯,bs −Xz,α¯,bs ∣∣ 6 eLfs |y − z| 6 εeLf (s−T ) 6 ε.
Thus, for all b ∈ B and s ∈ [0, T ] we have distR1α(x)(X
z,α¯,b
s ) 6 ε, which finally proves
that R1α(x) is a dominion for player 1.
For R2b(·)(x) the proof is identical, up to the changes in players’ role. The main
difference concerns the construction, for any point y ∈ R2b(·)(x) and any strategy
α ∈ A of player 1, of a control b¯ ∈ B of player 2 such that Xy,α,b¯s ∈ R
2
b(·)(x) for
all s > 0. We next detail this construction. Let α¯ ∈ A and t > 0 be such that
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y = Xx,α¯,bα¯t . Let us also define, for any b ∈ B, the control σtb by (σtb)s = bs+t. We
then define a nonanticipating strategy α¯|α as follows:
(α¯|α)[b]s =
{
α¯[b]s, if s 6 t,
α[σtb]s−t, if s > t.
If we set b¯ = σtbα¯|α, one can check that X
y,α,b¯
s = X
x,α¯|α,bα¯|α
s+t for all s > 0 (in partic-
ular we have X
x,α¯|α,bα¯|α
t = X
x,α¯,bα¯
t = y because the map α 7→ bα is nonanticipating
and so (bα¯|α)s = (bα¯)s for almost all s ∈ [0, t]). Hence the result. 
5. Unique ergodicity of differential games
In this final section, we define the notion of unique ergodicity for zero-sum differ-
ential games and provide necessary and sufficient conditions. In the whole section,
we fix a deterministic zero-sum differential game in its lower form Γ−. As usual,
the operator H refers to the Hamiltonian (2) of the game and H∞ to its recession
operator (4).
5.1. Definition and necessary condition. We start by introducing the notions
of ergodicity and unique ergodicity for differential games.
Definition 5.1 (Ergodicity of differential games). The differential game Γ− is
ergodic if the normalized value δvδ(x) converges uniformly in x to a constant when
δ goes to 0 (or equivalently if v(t, x)/t converges uniformly to a constant when t
goes to +∞).
The game Γ− is uniquely ergodic if for every continuous and Zn-periodic function
g : Rn → R, the perturbed game with running payoff (x, a, b) 7→ ℓ(x, a, b) + g(x), all
other data being equal, is ergodic.
We know from the characterization of vδ(·) or v(t, ·) as viscosity solutions of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs (Theorem 2.2) that the game Γ− is (uniquely) ergodic
if and only if its Hamiltonian H is (see Section 3). Hence Theorem 3.2 already
provides conditions of unique ergodicity. The purpose of this section is to give other
conditions which involve the controlled system (1) and the dominions associated
with it. The next result provides such a necessary condition. It is based on the
very simple idea that a player will leverage one of his dominion if the payoff is more
favorable on this dominion than in the rest of the states.
Let us recall that the state space is essentially the n-torus Rn/Zn. However, the
image of a closed set in Rn/Zn is not necessarily closed, which is problematic when
considering dominions. To illustrate this issue, think of the dominions V 1µ and V
2
ν
described in Example 4.5 when µ or ν are irrational, i.e., when their image in R2/Z2
is dense. For this reason, we introduce the following definition of “dominion in the
torus”. Note that we let π : Rn → Rn/Zn be the quotient map.
Definition 5.2 (Dominion in the torus). A set K ⊂ Rn/Zn is a dominion in the
torus of some player if K = π(D) for some dominion D ⊂ Rn of that player in Γ−.
Note that if D ⊂ Rn is a dominion, then π−1
(
π(D)
)
= π−1(π(D)) is also a do-
minion in Rn (more generally, thanks to (8), if a set is approximately invariant, then
so is its closure). Furthermore, the latter set is Zn-translation-invariant, meaning
that for every x ∈ π−1
(
π(D)
)
and every k ∈ Zn, we have x+ k ∈ π−1
(
π(D)
)
.
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We can now state a necessary condition of unique ergodicity involving dominions
in the torus.
Proposition 5.3. If the differential game Γ− is uniquely ergodic, then the inter-
section of every dominion of player 1 with every dominion of player 2 in the torus
is nonempty, that is, for every dominion D1 of player 1 and every dominion D2 of
player 2 in Rn, we have
π(D1) ∩ π(D2) 6= ∅.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive and, to this end, we suppose that there exist
in Rn a dominion of player 1, D1, and a dominion of player 2, D2, such that
π(D1) ∩ π(D2) = ∅. Since the sets π−1
(
π(D1\2)
)
are also dominions in Rn, we
can assume without loss of generality that D1\2 are Zn-translation-invariant and
that D1 ∩D2 = ∅. So we can find ε > 0 such that D1ε and D
2
ε also have an empty
intersection (recall that D
1\2
ε = {x ∈ Rn | distD1\2(x) 6 ε}). We then consider any
function g ∈ C0per(R
n) satisfying
(13)

g(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ D1ε ,
g(x) = 3Mℓ, ∀x ∈ D2ε ,
0 6 g(x) 6 3Mℓ, otherwise,
where Mℓ equals ‖ℓ‖∞ if ℓ 6= 0 and any positive real otherwise. Thus, the function
g satisfies, for all x ∈ Rn,
3Mℓ1D2ε (x) 6 g(x) 6 3Mℓ(1− 1D1ε (x)).
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be any discount factor. From the above inequalities, we deduce
that for all x ∈ Rn, all strategies α of player 1 and all controls b of player 2,
−Mℓ + δ
∫ ∞
0
3Mℓe
−δs1D2ε
(
Xx,α,bs
)
ds
6 δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs
(
ℓ(Xx,α,bs , α[b]s, bs) + g(X
x,α,b
s )
)
ds
6Mℓ + δ
∫ ∞
0
3Mℓe
−δs
(
1− 1D1ε
(
Xx,α,bs
))
ds.
Let us denote by vgδ the unnormalized value of the discounted game with the per-
turbed running payoff (x, a, b) 7→ ℓ(x, a, b) + g(x). Taking the supremum over
b ∈ B and then the infimum over α ∈ A in the latter inequalities, we deduce
from Lemma 4.6 that δvgδ (x) 6 Mℓ for all x ∈ D
1, and from Lemma 4.7 that
2Mℓ 6 δv
g
δ (y) for all y ∈ D
2. Thus, if x ∈ D1 and y ∈ D2, we have
lim inf
δ→0
(
δvgδ (y)− δv
g
δ (x)
)
>Mℓ > 0
which proves that the perturbed game is not ergodic, hence that Γ− is not uniquely
ergodic. 
Remark 5.4 (Comparison with one-player controlled systems). It is instructive
to compare the latter necessary condition of unique ergodicity with the result of
Arisawa in [Ari97], which deals with optimal control problems, i.e., problems for
systems controlled by one player (who is minimizing and which we call player 1).
In this paper, she proved that if the controlled system is uniquely ergodic, then
there exists an ergodic attractor D which satisfies the following properties.
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(P) D is closed, connected and positively invariant.
(D) D is nonempty and y ∈ D if and only if for any x ∈ Rn and any ε > 0, there
exists Tε > 0 and aε ∈ A such that limε→0 Tε = +∞ and
∣∣y −Xx,aεTε ∣∣ < ε.
(A) D has the following time-averaged attracting property: for any neighborhood
U of D and any x ∈ Rn,
lim
δ→0
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1U (X
x,a
s )ds = 1, uniformly in a ∈ A.
For such controlled systems, if we introduce a second player as a dummy to
cast the problem within the framework of two-player differential games, then it
readily follows from the definition that the dominions of player 2 correspond to the
nonempty closed and positively invariant sets (indeed, every positive orbit through
any point in a dominion of player 2 is within any ε-neighborhood of the dominion
for any arbitrary period of time). Let us observe that these sets are also dominions
of player 1 and that the intersection of two dominions of player 2, if nonempty, is
another dominion of player 2.
Then, applying Proposition 5.3, we deduce that if unique ergodicity holds, there
is a unique minimal nonempty closed positively invariant set in the torus and that
this set intersect every dominion of player 1 in the torus. We claim that this set is
the ergodic attractor D described in [Ari97] and that the two results are equivalent.
Indeed it follows from the properties (P) and (D) that the ergodic attractorD is the
unique minimal dominion of player 2 (the uniqueness comes from the connectedness
in (P) and the minimality from (D)) and property (A) implies that any dominion
of player 1 cannot be disjoint from D. Conversely, if D is the unique minimal
dominion of player 2 whose existence stems from Proposition 5.3, then property
(P) is readily verified. Furthermore, its minimality implies that any point x ∈ D is
approximately controllable to any other point y ∈ D. Then, since every dominion
of player 1 meets D, and particularly the closure of any positive orbit, we can show
that property (D) holds. Finally using (P) and (D) we can then prove that (A)
holds, as is done in [Ari97].
5.2. Sufficient condition via PDE approach. In this subsection, we give a
sufficient condition of unique ergodicity which is derived from Theorem 3.2. We
start with a lemma that relates the solutions of (HJ∞) to dominions.
Lemma 5.5. Let w be any continuous viscosity solution of (HJ∞). Then argminw
is a dominion of player 1 and argmaxw is a dominion of player 2.
Proof. Let us first consider the differential game with the same definition as Γ−
except for the payoff function ℓ which is replaced with w. The Hamiltonian associ-
ated to this game is H∞(x, p)−w(x) and since, for any δ > 0, the function δ
−1w is
solution to (HJδ) with the latter Hamiltonian, we deduce from Theorem 2.2 that it
is the (unnormalized) value of the infinite-horizon discounted game. Thus, for all
points x in Rn and all positive factors δ we have
(14) δ−1w(x) = inf
α∈A
sup
b∈B
∫ ∞
0
e−δsw(Xx,α,bs )ds.
Now set D = argminw and let us assume, without loss of generality, that
minw = 0. Also, since the case with w constant is trivial, we can assume that
D 6= Rn. In view of Lemma 4.6, we fix arbitrary positive constants ε and δ. Again,
if Dε = {x ∈ R
n | distD(x) 6 ε} is the whole space R
n, then the equality in
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Lemma 4.6 trivially holds, so we assume that ε is small enough so that Dε 6= Rn.
Then, denoting by mε the infimum of w on the complement of Dε, which is neces-
sarily positive, we can write
w(x) > mε (1− 1Dε(x))
for all x ∈ Rn. By plugging this inequality into the right-hand side of (14), we
obtain for all x ∈ Rn
w(x) > inf
α∈A
sup
b∈B
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δsmε
(
1− 1Dε(X
x,α,b
s )
)
ds.
After simplification, this yields, for all x ∈ D,
0 > 1− sup
α∈A
inf
b∈B
δ
∫ ∞
0
e−δs1Dε(X
x,α,b
s )ds.
Since the converse inequality is obviously true, we deduce that there is in fact
equality and thus, by Lemma 4.6, that D is a dominion of player 1.
With very similar arguments and using Lemma 4.7 instead of Lemma 4.6, we
can show that argmaxw is a dominion of player 2. 
We know that if the value function δvδ converges uniformly to some function v
then it is solution to (HJ∞). This entails the following corollary
Corollary 5.6. Assume that the value function δvδ converges uniformly to some
function v. Then argmin v and argmax v are dominions of player 1 and player 2,
respectively.
A straightforward consequence is that if argmin v and argmax v have a nonempty
intersection, then v is constant and the game is ergodic. We can extend this result
to unique ergodicity with the help of Theorem 3.2 and thus provide a converse to
Proposition 5.3.
Theorem 5.7. Assume that in the differential game Γ−, the intersection of every
dominion of player 1 with every dominion of player 2 in the torus is nonempty.
Then the strong maximum principle (see Theorem 3.2) holds, i.e., the constant
functions are the only solutions of (HJ∞).
If, moreover, the structural equicontinuity property is true, then Γ− is uniquely
ergodic if and only if the two players do not have disjoint dominions in Rn/Zn.
Proof. Let w be any solution of (HJ∞). Let D
1 = argminw and D2 = argmaxw.
Since w is Zn-periodic and continuous, it passes to the quotient into a continuous
map on the torus whose minimum (resp., maximum) is attained on π(D1) (resp.,
π(D2)). Hence, π(D1\2) are necessarily closed and we have D1\2 = π−1
(
π(D1\2)
)
.
Using now Lemma 5.5, we deduce that π(D1)∩π(D2) hence D1 ∩D2 is nonempty.
So w is constant.
The rest of the proof follows from Proposition 5.3 and Theorem 3.2. 
Note that if the controlled system (1) is Lipschitz continuous, meaning that there
is a positive constant L for which∣∣∣Xx,a,bt −Xy,a,bt ∣∣∣ 6 L |x− y| , ∀x, y ∈ Rn, ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B, ∀t > 0,
then the family {δvδ} is equi-Lipschitz for any payoff function ℓ. In that case we
can use the latter theorem to characterize unique ergodicity in terms of dominions.
This is in particular the case if the function f does not depend on the state variable.
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C2γ
X
x,αε,b
t − x
X
y,a,βε
t − y
Figure 1. Trajectories in D1ε and D
2
ε .
Example 5.8. Let us go back to the game introduced in Examples 3.4 and 4.5,
whose dynamics is defined in R2 by the function
f(x, a, b) =
(
a
γb
)
, a, b ∈ [−1, 1],
with 0 < γ 6 1 and whose payoff function ℓ is any function satisfying Assump-
tion A0. We already mentioned the family of value functions {δvδ}0<δ61 is equicon-
tinuous (see Example 3.6 or the above remark). Hence the structural equicontinuity
property holds.
If γ is a rational number then, for any x, y ∈ R2, the lines
V 11/γ = x+
(
1/γ
1
)
R and V 2γ = y +
(
1
γ
)
R
are dominions of player 1 and player 2, respectively, and their quotient images in
the torus R2/Z2 are closed and disjoint for suitable x and y. Thus, according to
Theorem 5.7, the game is not uniquely ergodic.
Assume now that γ is not a rational number and consider in R2 any dominionsD1
and D2 of player 1 and player 2, respectively. We next show that their intersection
in the torus is not empty. Let us fix two points, x ∈ D1 and y ∈ D2, in these
dominions. By definition, given ε > 0 and T > 0, player 1 has a strategy αε ∈ A
such that for every action b ∈ B of player 2, we have distD1(X
x,αε,b
t ) 6 ε for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, if b is the constant control equal to 1, then we have(
−1
γ
)
6 X˙x,αε,bt 6
(
1
γ
)
, ∀t > 0,
that is, the (continuous) trajectory of the dynamical system has the property that
Xx,αε,bt −X
x,αε,b
s is included in the cone C
1
γ = {z = (z1, z2)
⊺ ∈ R2 | −z2 6 γz1 6 z2}
for all 0 6 s 6 t 6 T (see Figure 1). Likewise, with the same ε and T , player 2 has
a strategy βε ∈ B such that distD2(X
y,a,βε
t ) 6 ε for all t ∈ [0, T ] and all a ∈ A,
and if player 1 chooses the constant control equal to 1, then we have(
1
−γ
)
6 X˙y,a,βεt 6
(
1
γ
)
, ∀t > 0,
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that is, the trajectory of the system is such that Xy,a,βεt − X
y,a,βε
s is included in
the cone C2γ = {z = (z1, z2)
⊺ ∈ R2 | −γz1 6 z2 6 γz1} for all 0 6 s 6 t 6 T (see
Figure 1).
Then, the parameter ε being fixed, either there is some time T such that the
images in the torus R2/Z2 of the two trajectories mentioned above intersect on the
time interval [0, T ] at some point zε ∈ R2/Z2, or for all times T their images always
remain disjoint, which is possible only if they are contained in the parallel half-
lines starting in x and y, respectively, and directed by the vector (1, γ)⊺. Indeed,
since γ /∈ Q, the images of these half-lines in the torus are dense, and therefore
any deviation of a trajectory from one of these half-lines eventually leads to the
intersection of the two trajectories.
If there are only finitely many points zε as described above, then we deduce that
D1 and D2 respectively contain the latter half-lines and therefore both dominions
correspond to the trivial dominion in R2/Z2, composed of the whole state space.
If there are infinitely many points zε, then any limit point is, by construction,
contained in both D1 and D2. In any case, we deduce that the players do not have
disjoint dominions in the torus and so, according to Theorem 5.7, that the game is
uniquely ergodic.
5.3. Sufficient condition via controllability approach. We assume in this
section that the controlled system (1) is not Lipschitz continuous (and in particular
that Lf > 0), so that equicontinuity of {δvδ} cannot be guaranteed. We also make
the standard assumption that the payoff function ℓ is Lipschitz continuous in x
uniformly in (a, b), i.e., that there exists Lℓ > 0 such that
|ℓ(x, a, b)− ℓ(y, a, b)| 6 Lℓ |x− y| , ∀x, y ∈ R
n, ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B.
We then have the following classical regularity property of the value function.
Proposition 5.9. If ℓ is Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in (a, b), then, for any
discount factor δ < Lf , the value function δvδ is Ho¨lder continuous with exponent
δ/Lf and constant L independent of δ:
|δvδ(x)− δvδ(y)| 6 L |x− y|
δ/Lf , ∀x, y ∈ Rn.
In view of unique ergodicity, the requirement that ℓ be uniformly Lipschitz con-
tinuous in x prevents us from considering any perturbation g ∈ C0per(R
n) of the
payoff function. If we want to use the latter result (which we need to prove the main
theorem of this section), we are bound to consider only perturbations g : Rn → R
that are Lipschitz continuous and Zn-periodic. Fortunately, this is not a major
restriction. Indeed, in the proof of Proposition 5.3 it is possible to consider a per-
turbation function g satisfying (13) which is Lipschitz. Thus we have the following
stronger result.
Proposition 5.10. Assume that for every Lipschitz continuous and Zn-periodic
function g : Rn → R, the perturbed differential game with payoff function (x, a, b) 7→
ℓ(x, a, b) + g(x) is ergodic. Then the players do not have disjoint dominions in
Rn/Zn. 
To compensate the lack of equicontinuity of {δvδ} we also need to introduce the
following controllability assumption, whose time estimate is borrowed from [Ari98]
(see also [Bet05]).
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Assumption A2 (Uniform time estimate). There exist constants γ ∈ [0, 1) and
C > 0 such that, for all ε > 0,
• for all α ∈ A , for all x ∈ Rn and all y ∈ R1α(x), there is a control b ∈ B and a
time t 6 C(− log ε)γ for which
∣∣∣y −Xx,α,bt ∣∣∣ 6 ε;
• for all nonanticipating map A → B, α 7→ bα, for all x ∈ Rn and all y ∈ R2b(·)(x),
there is a strategy α ∈ A and a time t 6 C(− log ε)γ for which
∣∣∣y −Xx,α,bαt ∣∣∣ 6 ε.
Let us emphasize that the purpose of this assumption is only to provide a uniform
bound on the time needed to approximately reach the target points. The fact that
the system is qualitatively approximately controlled by one player or the other to
these points is a direct consequence of the definition of the reachable sets R1α(x)
and R2b(·)(x).
We can now give a condition for the (somewhat modified version of) unique
ergodicity of differential games.
Theorem 5.11. For the differential game Γ−, suppose that Assumption A2 holds
and that the payoff function ℓ is Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in (a, b). The
following assertions are equivalent:
(i) for every function ℓ′ : Rn × A × B → R which is Lipschitz continuous in x
uniformly in (a, b) and Zn-periodic in x, the modified game with running payoff
ℓ′ is ergodic;
(ii) for every Lipschitz continuous and Zn-periodic function g : Rn → R, the per-
turbed game with running payoff (x, a, b) 7→ ℓ(x, a, b) + g(x) is ergodic;
(iii) the players do not have disjoint dominions in the torus.
Proof. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) is trivial and we already know from Proposi-
tion 5.10 that (ii) ⇒ (iii). So we only need to prove that (iii) ⇒ (i). And since the
payoff function ℓ is arbitrary and assertion (iii) does not depend on it, if we prove
that Γ− is ergodic, the result will be true for any other payoff function ℓ′.
Let δ > 0 be any discount factor and let ε be a fixed positive real. Let x, y be
any points in Rn. From the dynamic programming principle, there exists a strategy
α1 ∈ A of player 1 (which depends only on δ, ε and x) such that
(15) vδ(x) + ε >
∫ t
0
e−δsℓ(Xx,α
1,b
s , α
1[b]s, bs)ds+ e
−δtvδ(X
x,α1,b
t )
for all times t > 0 and all controls b ∈ B. Similarly, for all α ∈ A , there exists a
control bα ∈ B of player 2 (which depends only on δ, ε, y and α) such that
(16) vδ(y)− ε 6
∫ t
0
e−δsℓ(Xy,α,bαs , α[bα]s, (bα)s)ds+ e
−δtvδ(X
y,α,bα
t )
for all times t > 0. Furthermore, the map α 7→ bα can be chosen nonanticipating,
as defined in Section 4.3 (indeed, for the controls bα to satisfy these conditions, we
can chose them so that vδ(x)− ε 6 Jδ(x, α, bα).
Let D1 = R1α1(x) and D
2 = R2b(·)(y) be the closures of the sets of reachable points
from x and y by player 2 and player 1, respectively, being fixed the strategy α1 and
the nonanticipating map α 7→ bα. We know from Lemma 4.9 that these sets are
respectively a dominion of player 1 and a dominion of player 2. Hence there exists
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a point z ∈ π−1
(
π(D1) ∩ π(D2)
)
. This implies that there are z1 ∈ D1, z2 ∈ D2
and k, l ∈ Zn such that∣∣z + k − z1∣∣ 6 ε/2 and ∣∣z + l − z2∣∣ 6 ε/2.
Moreover, Assumption A2 guarantees the existence of a control b
1 ∈ B, a strategy
α2 ∈ A and times t1, t2 6 C(− log ε)γ such that∣∣∣z1 −Xx,α1,b1t1 ∣∣∣ 6 ε/2 and ∣∣∣z2 −Xy,α2,bα2t2 ∣∣∣ 6 ε/2.
Combining these inequalities, we get∣∣∣z + k −Xx,α1,b1t1 ∣∣∣ 6 ε and ∣∣∣z + l −Xy,α2,bα2t2 ∣∣∣ 6 ε.
Since the inequalities (15) and (16) hold uniformly in t, we can now write them
at times t1 and t2 respectively, and then use the estimates that we have just estab-
lished. We recall that, for δ small enough, the function δvδ is Ho¨lder continuous
with exponent δ/Lf and constant L. We also recall that vδ is Z
n-periodic. Let
Tε = C(− log ε)γ for simplicity. From (15) we get
δvδ(x) − δvδ(z) + δε
> −Mℓ(1 − e
−δt1) + e−δt1
(
δvδ(X
x,α1,b1
t1 )− δvδ(z + k)
)
− (1− e−δt1)δvδ(z),
> −(1− e−δt1)(δvδ(z) +Mℓ)− e
−δt1Lεδ/Lf ,
> −(1− e−δTε)(δvδ(z) +Mℓ)− Lε
δ/Lf ,
where we use the fact that δvδ(z) +Mℓ > 0 and e
−δt1 6 1.
On the other hand, from (16) we get
δvδ(y)− δvδ(z)− δε
6Mℓ(1− e
−δt2) + e−δt2
(
δvδ(X
y,α2,b
α2
t2 )− δvδ(z + l)
)
− (1− e−δt2)δvδ(z),
6 (1− e−δt2)(−δvδ(z) +Mℓ) + e
−δt2Lεδ/Lf ,
6 (1− e−δTε)(−δvδ(z) +Mℓ) + Lε
δ/Lf .
Here we use the fact that −δvδ(z) +Mℓ > 0 and e−δt2 6 1.
Combining the two inequalities and letting M = max{Mℓ, L}, we obtain, for all
δ, ε > 0,
(17) δvδ(x) − δvδ(y) > −2δε− 2M
(
1− e−δTε + e(δ log ε)/Lf
)
.
Since Tε = C(− log ε)γ , choosing ε such that log ε = −δ−(1+ω) with 0 < ω <
1
γ − 1,
we observe that the right-hand side of the latter inequality converges to zero as δ
vanishes, which yields
lim inf
δ→0
(
δvδ(x) − δvδ(y)
)
> 0.
Since the points x and y are arbitrary and the bound in (17) does not depend on
them, we deduce that
lim
δ→0
(
δvδ(x)− δvδ(y)
)
= 0
uniformly in x, y ∈ Rn.
The rest of the proof is classical (see for instance [Ari98]), but one may also
notice that the latter uniform limit together with the continuity of (δ, x) 7→ δvδ(x)
on (0, 1]×Rn (see the proof of Theorem 3.2) entails the equicontinuity of the family
{δvδ}0<δ61. We can then conclude with Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 5.7 . 
26 A. HOCHART
References
[AB03] O. Alvarez and M. Bardi, Singular perturbations of nonlinear degenerate parabolic
PDEs: a general convergence result, Arch. Ration. Mech. Anal. 170 (2003), no. 1,
17–61.
[AB07] , Ergodic problems in differential games, Advances in dynamic game theory, Ann.
Internat. Soc. Dynam. Games, vol. 9, Birkha¨user Boston, Boston, MA, 2007, pp. 131–
152.
[AB10] , Ergodicity, stabilization, and singular perturbations for Bellman-Isaacs equa-
tions, Mem. Amer. Math. Soc. 204 (2010), no. 960, vi+77.
[AF09] J.-P. Aubin and H. Frankowska, Set-valued analysis, Modern Birkha¨user Classics,
Birkha¨user Boston, Inc., Boston, MA, 2009, Reprint of the 1990 edition.
[AGH19] M. Akian, S. Gaubert, and A. Hochart, A game theory approach to the existence and
uniqueness of nonlinear Perron-Frobenius eigenvectors, arXiv:1812.09871, 2019.
[AL98] M. Arisawa and P.-L. Lions, On ergodic stochastic control, Comm. Partial Differential
Equations 23 (1998), no. 11-12, 2187–2217.
[Ari97] M. Arisawa, Ergodic problem for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. I. Existence
of the ergodic attractor, Ann. Inst. H. Poincare´ Anal. Non Line´aire 14 (1997), no. 4,
415–438.
[Ari98] , Ergodic problem for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. II, Ann. Inst. H.
Poincare´ Anal. Non Line´aire 15 (1998), no. 1, 1–24.
[BCD97] M. Bardi and I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta, Optimal control and viscosity solutions of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations, Systems & Control: Foundations & Applications, Birkha¨user
Boston, Inc., Boston, MA, 1997.
[Bet05] P. Bettiol, On ergodic problem for Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations, ESAIM Control
Optim. Calc. Var. 11 (2005), no. 4, 522–541.
[Car96] P. Cardaliaguet, A differential game with two players and one target, SIAM J. Control
Optim. 34 (1996), no. 4, 1441–1460.
[Car10] , Ergodicity of Hamilton-Jacobi equations with a noncoercive nonconvex Hamil-
tonian in R2/Z2, Ann. Inst. H. Poincare´ Anal. Non Line´aire 27 (2010), no. 3, 837–856.
[Hoc19] A. Hochart, An accretive operator approach to ergodic zero-sum stochastic games, J.
Dyn. Games 6 (2019), no. 1, 27–51.
[LPV87] P.-L. Lions, G. Papanicolaou, and S. R. S. Varadhan, Homogenization of Hamilton-
Jacobi equations, unpublished work, 1987.
Facultad de Ingenier´ıa y Ciencia, Universidad Adolfo Iba´n˜ez, Diagonal Las Torres
2640, Santiago, Chile
E-mail address: antoine.hochart@gmail.com
